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CONSCRIPTING PRIVATE RESOURCES TO
MEET URBAN NEEDS: THE STATUTORY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF AFFORDABLE
HOUSING IMPACT FEES IN NEW YORK
I. Introduction
Urban local governments face greater financial strain today than
perhaps at any other time in American history.' Demographic
changes in American cities, particularly those in the industrial Northeast and Midwest, have placed municipal governments in a financial
dilemma where demand for government economic and social assistance has expanded dramatically while municipal revenue bases have
contracted. 2 This situation has been compounded by the accelerating
decay of urban infrastructure. Many of the infrastructural assets so
vital to cities, such as bridges, water mains, and highways, were built
in the early twentieth century.3 In recent years, an alarming number
of these facilities have deteriorated to the point where emergency repairs or replacement is necessary.' In short, many American cities
were in need of social and physical rebuilding by the end of the
1980's.
Sources of municipal revenue have not kept pace with the need for
expenditure, however. Today's city governments draw from a revenue base which has contracted sharply over the past twenty years.
The urban middle class, which provided urban governments with a
strong and reliable tax base, fled the inner city beginning in the
1960's.5 In their place came a population of significantly lower socioeconomic status 6 whose incomes proved to be a less lucrative source
of revenue. Widespread property abandonment and tax avoidance resulted in a tremendous number of municipal property foreclosures,7
1. Shari Rudavsky, Financially Strapped Cities Seek Help, WASH. POST, July 9,
1992, at A21.
2. JAMES HEILBRUN, URBAN ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 443 (1987).
3. Pete Bowles, NYC: A Subject for Mr. Fix-Its, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Sept. 15, 1992, at
26.
4. Id.; see also JEFFERY R. HENIG, PUBLIC POLICY & FEDERALISM 134 (1985).
5. See HEILBRUN, supra note 2, at 443; PETER 0. MULLER, CONTEMPORARY SUBURBAN AMERICA 55 (1981).
6. See Michael Abromowitz, The Urban Boom: Who Benefits? Building Frenzy's
Failure to Help Cities' Poor Core Puts Some Economic Assumptions in Doubt, WASH.
POST, May 10, 1992, at HI. Between 1980 and 1990, the percentage of central city residents living beneath the poverty line increased from 16.5 to 18.7 percent.
7. During the 1970's, New York City alone took ownership of over 100,000 housing
units as a result of abandonment and tax foreclosure. The numbers are rising again -

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. XX

leaving cities owning thousands of the properties that had once provided so much in property tax revenue. When cities turned to corporate incomes to raise needed revenue, frequently they found longestablished corporations ready to relocate to suburban or sunbelt locations on short notice.'
This shrinking -tax base had an adverse impact on municipalities'
other primary source of revenue - debt financing. In the wake of
municipal financial disasters such as New York City's near-default in
1975 and Bridgeport, Connecticut's total bankruptcy in 1991, investors have cast a skeptical eye on municipal bonds as a prudent and
attractive investment. In recent years, several cities have had their
municipal bond ratings downgraded. 9 Philadelphia, the nation's fifthlargest city, inspires such a low level of investor confidence that it has
come to be called the "junk bond town."' 0 Given this depressed level
of investor support, cities have experienced far greater difficulty raising funds through bond issues, and lower ratings have forced them to
pay higher interest rates for the bonds they do manage to sell."
Finally, cities' fiscal situations have been exacerbated by political
and intergovernmental factors. Beginning in 1981, the Reagan Administration's "New Federalism" approach to federal funding
changed the relationship which had existed between cities and federal
government since the 1960's. Under President Lyndon Johnson's
Great Society programs, federal urban programs provided for direct
transfers between the federal and local governments. The "New Federalism" approach, however, sought to increase states' participation
in these programs. Direct federal payments to cities were therefore
reduced significantly,' 2 as a greater percentage of federal aid was disthe city took foreclosure action against twice as many properties in the first half of 1990
as in all of 1989. See John Gilbert, This Property is Abandoned, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Jan. 8,
1991, at 40.
8. Susan Sachs, Tax Incentives Are Urged to Keep Companies Here, N.Y. NEWSDAY,
June 16, 1990, at 43.
9. New York City's bonds were downgraded by Moody's Rating Service on February 11, 1991. Jennifer Preston, Moody's Downgrades City Bonds, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Feb.
12, 1991, at 7. Washington, D.C. had its bond rating lowered in May, 1990. Michael
Abromowitz, Rating of D. C.Bonds Reduced; City Faces Higher Costsfor Projects,WASH.
POST, May 4, 1990, at CI.
10. Michael Specter, Philadelphia'sStory is a Fiscal Cliffhanger; Fifth Largest City on
Brink of Bankruptcy, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 1990, at A3.
11. See supra note 9.
12. In 1980, the federal government provided $47 billion in direct transfers to local
governments. Ten years later, this number had fallen to $19.8 billion. Abromowitz,
supra note 6. In particular, federal housing aid was cut 75% between fiscal years 1981
and 1989. Becky Sherblum, Affordable Housing and Local Governments, in THE MUNICIPAL YEAR BOOK 39 (Int'l City Mgmt. Assoc. 1991).
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tributed in the form of "block grants" to the states, which in turn
distributed the funds to local governments. 13 As a result of the declining level of political influence enjoyed by cities (due to a relative
loss in population compared with suburban areas) and general unwillingness of suburban voters to support subsidies and other programs
designed to aid the cities they fled,14 cities found it difficult to compensate for their declining sources of revenue.15
Faced with these fiscal realities, urban governments have sought
innovative new ways of shifting a portion of their financial burdens to
private actors. One recent method of burden-shifting involves the use
of impact fees and linkage. Impact fees and linkage represent a
uniquely urban adaptation of the exaction and dedication requirements that have long been used by suburban governments to shift certain burdens of development to residential subdivision developers.
Through impact fee and linkage requirements, cities such as San
Francisco, Sacramento, and Boston have forced private developers to
share the cost of mitigating the potential impacts of their developments on transportation, infrastructure, and affordable housing by
conditioning development permits on developers' payment of fees to
help fund these government services.16 Not surprisingly, developers
frequently have sought to challenge these fee requirements in court.
New York City faces the stiff challenges described above.
Throughout 1990 and 1991, New York confronted what has been described as its most difficult financial situation since the 1975 fiscal crisis. 17 The City's 1993-94 budget also included a significant budget

deficit, requiring cutbacks in many areas."8 These recent financial difficulties have endangered one of the largest undertakings by a city
government in recent years - New York City's ten-year, $5.2 billion
plan to increase and preserve, through new construction and rehabilitation, the city's stock of affordable housing.19 While New York City
13. See ANN O'M. BOWMAN &
STATES

RICHARD C. KEARNEY, THE RESURGENCE OF THE

6-8 (1986).

14. See HENIG, supra note 4, at 19.
15. See supra text accompanying notes 1-8.
16. See generally John J. Delaney et al., The Needs-Nexus Analysis: A Unified Test for
Validating Subdivision Exactions, Impact Fees, and Linkage, 50 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS.

139 (1987).

17. See Michael Specter, N. Y Budget Morass has City, State on Brink; Imminent Fiscal Crisis Fails to Force Consensus, WASH. POST, May 18, 1991, at A3.
18. William Bunch, They're Back: City's Fiscal Woes, N.Y. NEWSDAY, June 14, 1993,
at 12. The city has projected budget deficits of $1.69 billion for 1994, $2.24 billion for
1995, and $2.61 billion for 1996.
19. See Jennifer Preston, Addition to Housing Plan Announced, N.Y. NEWSDAY, May
5, 1988, at 30.
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has not pursued a formal impact fee or linkage strategy as a means of
assisting its housing programs, it has long used its political leverage
informally to condition development plan approval on the developer's
agreement to provide funds for municipal necessities. While this has
at times been successful, the city's ad hoc burden-sharing schemes
have largely been dominated by personalities, political bickering, and
favoritism.20 In light of these practices, a formal impact fee provision
enacted by the New York City Council clearly would inject more uniformity and fairness into the city's burden-sharing practices.
This Note examines whether New York City could, consistent with
its statutory powers and constitutional principles, enact an affordable
housing impact fee ordinance. Part II of this Note provides a background discussion of the burden-sharing devices used by local governments to date. Part III examines the judicial standards that have been
used to review these exaction requirements, focusing closely on the
impact of recent New York caselaw and the United States Supreme
Court's 1987 decision in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.2"
Part IV discusses recent federal and state interpretations of Nollan,
and will argue that New York City validly may enact an affordable
housing impact fee ordinance. Part V concludes by encouraging the
New York City Council to consider enacting such an ordinance. The
appendix to this Note offers a model affordable housing linkage provision which should be able to survive judicial review on both statutory
and constitutional grounds.
II. An Overview of Municipal Burden-Sharing Devices
A.

Subdivision Exaction

Subdivision exaction (or dedication) requirements are the oldest
type of municipal burden-sharing device, having been in use since the
1930's.2 Exaction requirements condition plat23 or subdivision ap20. The city was recently at odds with the state Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) over an informal linkage scheme whereby developer Donald Trump, in order
to receive approval of his expansive development proposal for the West Side of Manhattan, would have to provide money for the rehabilitation and expansion of the nearby
72nd Street IRT subway station. While the city has no jurisdiction over the station, it
was a city official who held up the development plan's approval until the station rehabilitation was agreed to by Trump. The MTA, which is responsible for the station's management and maintenance, was not represented in the negotiations, and (unhappily) called
the resulting deal "unbelievable." See David Henry, Why is This Man Smiling? MTA:
Sellout! Says Messinger Trumped Deal, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Aug. 28, 1992, at 3.
21. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
22. See Theodore Taub, Exactions, Dedications, and Impact Fees, C750 ALI-ABA
885 (1992).
23. "Plat" is defined as a "map of a specific land area such as a town, section or
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proval on the developer's agreement to dedicate land to the municipality for the streets, sidewalks, and utilities necessitated by the new
development. 24 Early dedication requirements involved the exaction
of land on the development site. 25 Eventually, however, municipalities began to require dedications of off-site land for improvements
such as schools and parks.2 6 Today, municipalities frequently require
subdivision developers to construct and dedicate the necessary facilities, rather than simply dedicate the land.2 7
B.

In-Lieu Payments
The traditional exaction requirement proved inappropriate for use
in all situations. For example, development of a small subdivision
might not have a large enough impact to justify exaction of an entire
school, though it undoubtedly would have an impact on existing educational resources by adding to the development area's school age
population. In-lieu payments emerged as a refinement of the traditional exaction requirement. 28 An in-lieu payment requires the subdivision developer to pay a fee that approximates the additional burden
placed on municipal resources by the proposed development.2 9 Using
the preceding example, an in-lieu payment would work in the following manner: if a new subdivision were projected to bring fifty new
students to a district, the municipality would require the developer to
pay a fee equal to one-tenth of the cost of a new 500-seat school.3 0
Money collected under in-lieu fee provisions must be placed in a fund
earmarked specifically for the facilities.3 1
C.

Impact Fees and Linkage
The impact fee is similar to the in-lieu payment, but is designed to
address a wider variety of needs. Impact fees are collected in the
same manner as in-lieu fees, but are used to finance large scale capital
projects such as sewage treatment plants, resource recovery facilities,
subdivision showing the location and boundaries of individual parcels subdivided into
lots." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1151 (6th ed. 1990).
24. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 33 (McKinney 1989); N.Y. TOWN LAW § 274
(McKinney 1987); CAL. GoV'T CODE § 66477 (West 1983 & Supp. 1987).
25. See Delaney, supra note 16, at 139.
26. Id. at 141.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 142.
29. Id.
30. The fee could also be used to expand or otherwise mitigate the development's
impact on an existing school.
31. See Donald L. Connors & Michael E. High, The Expanding Circle of Exactions:
From Dedication to Linkage, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 70, 71 (1987).
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and water and public safety projects.3 2
Linkage represents an extension of the impact fee concept, and as
such is the broadest and most powerful burden-shifting tool available
to municipalities. Through linkage requirements, municipalities condition subdivision, plat, and site plan 33 approval on payment of a fee
to finance social and subsidized development programs, such as lowincome housing and job training.3 4
In addition to being used to finance a wider variety of projects, impact fees and linkage are distinguishable from traditional exaction requirements in that they are applied to all types of new development,
not just subdivisions. 35 These two distinguishing factors make impact
fees and linkage a much more powerful and flexible tool than traditional exaction requirements, and make them particularly useful to
city (as opposed to suburban and rural) governments.
III. Judicial Standards Used to Review Exaction and
Impact Fee Requirements
Faced with onerous fee requirements designed to shift the burdens
of municipal governance onto them, developers frequently have
sought to challenge the validity of municipal exaction requirements.
Legal challenges to exaction and impact fees traditionally have taken
one of two forms. First, developers have sought to challenge exaction
requirements on the ground that municipalities lacked the statutory
authority to impose them. Second, exactions have been challenged as
unconstitutional takings in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution.3 6
Traditional exaction and in-lieu payment requirements have received deferential treatment from reviewing courts.37 Impact fee and
linkage requirements, however, have been scrutinized more carefully. 38 Courts have been hesitant to find that municipalities possess
the statutory authority to impose impact fee and linkage requirements. Where the requisite statutory authority has been found to ex32. Delaney, supra note 16, at 142.
33. "Site plan" refers generally to a plat prepared for a single property. See supra
note 23; see also N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-725(1) (McKinney Supp. 1993).
34. Delaney, supra note 16, at 143.

35. Id.
36. Developers have also charged that exaction requirements violate state and federal
due process and equal protection guarantees, and that they represent unauthorized taxes.
These claims involve different concepts than the statutory authority and takings claims,
and are beyond the scope of this Note.
37. See Delaney, supra note 16, at 141; Ayres v. City Council, 207 P.2d I (Cal. 1949).
38. See Delaney, supra note 16, at 141.
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ist, courts have also engaged in probing inquiries as to the
constitutionality of the impact fee provision in light of the often attenuated relationship between the purpose underlying the fee and the development approval, which is conditioned upon payment of the fee.
A.

Statutory Authority

Local governments, unlike the federal government 39 and the
states,' have no independent authority. Any power exercised by a
municipal government must have been conferred upon it through express or implied grant from the state.41 Consequently, municipalities
must be authorized under a state constitution or statute to enact impact fee42 requirements. As of August, 1992, however, only nineteen
states specifically had authorized municipalities to impose impact
fees.43
In the states where impact fee legislation has not been enacted, the
question of whether municipalities may impose impact fees is likely to
depend on how broadly the state construes municipal powers generally. Typically, state courts that construe municipal power broadly
find that impact fees represent permissible exercises of the exaction
power 4 that has been granted, in varying degrees, to municipalities in
every state.4 5 In states where courts take a more limited view of municipal power, courts have found that impact fee requirements are
47
either ultra vires 46 or preempted by general state laws.
While the New York State Legislature has considered impact fee
39. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
40. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
41. See, e.g., Coconato v. Town of Esopus, 547 N.Y.S.2d 953, 954 (App. Div. 1989)
(citing Kew Gardens Rd. Assoc. v. Tyburski, 514 N.E.2d 1114 (N.Y. 1987)).
42. For purposes of brevity, impact fee will be used to refer to both impact fee and
linkage requirements for the remainder of this Note, except where the difference between
the concepts is relevant.
43. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-1983 (1991); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65683.12
(West 1992); FLA. STAT. § 163.3202 (1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 36-71-1 (1991); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 46-142 (1992) (counties only); IDAHO CODE § 67-8202 (1992); ILL. ANN.
STAT. § 5-903 (Smith-Hurd 1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 36-7-4-1311 (Burns 1991); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 65.910 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30A, § 4301 (West Supp. 1992); MD. LOCAL GOV'T CODE ANN. § 9 (1990); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 278B.020 (Michie 1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 674.21 (1991); PA.
STAT. ANN. § 10503-A (1992); TEX. LOCAL GOV'T CODE ANN. § 395.015 (West Supp.
1992); VT. STAT. ANN. § 4350 (1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-466 (Michie 1992);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 82.02.050 (West Supp. 1992); W. VA. CODE § 7-20-7 (1990).
44. See, e.g. St. Johns County v. Northeast Florida Builders Ass'n, 583 So. 2d 635
(Fla. 1991) (broad construction of general municipal authority supported impact fee
requirement).
45. See Delaney, supra note 16, at 146.
46. See, e.g., Eastern Diversified Properties v. Montgomery County, 570 A.2d 850
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legislation, it has not enacted an impact fee statute.4" Therefore, the
statutory validity of any impact fee requirement imposed by a New
York municipality would depend upon how broadly New York courts
construe municipalities' general and exaction powers.
Any examination of a New York municipality's authority must begin with an examination of Article IX of the New York Constitution.
Municipalities' inherent powers are set forth in Article IX, section
one of the constitution, which states that "[e]ffective local self-government and intergovernmental cooperation are purposes of the people of
the state."49 Among the powers set forth in section one is the power
of local governments to "apportion the cost of a governmental service
or function upon any portion of its area, as authorized by act of the
legislature." 50 The caveat inserted at the end of this section is found
in each subsection of section one, making clear that the "Bill of
Rights" confers no self-executing powers at all - the powers set forth
may not be executed until the legislature gives its authorization. 5'
Article IX, section two, however, does grant local governments a
limited amount of inherent power.- 2 Section two grants local governments the power to "adopt and amend local laws not inconsistent
with the provisions of this constitution or any general law relating to
its property, affairs, and government. ' ' 53 This power to adopt local
laws relating to these subjects, however, is expressly subordinated to
the state legislature's power to make general laws.54 In short, while
the state constitution speaks of the state's interest in "effective local
self-government, '"55 it clearly subordinates the authority and interests
of local governments to those of the state.
In light of these state constitutional provisions, any attempt by a
municipality to impose exaction or impact fee requirements would
have to be supported by legislative grant, unless it fell squarely within
(Md. 1990) (narrow construction of municipal power rendered impact fee ordinance invalid absent specific legislative authority).
47. See infra text accompanying notes 55-80.
48. N.Y.A.B. 10127, 214th General Assembly, 2d sess. (1991); N.Y.S.B. 6224, 214th
Senate, 2d sess. (1991). The Assembly bill was referred to the Assembly Ways & Means
Committee in June, 1991. No further action was taken. The Senate bill was withdrawn
prior to consideration by the Senate.
49. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 1 ("Bill of Rights for local governments").
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2 ("home rule powers of local governments; statute of
local governments").
53. Id. § 2(3)(i). This power was subsequently conferred by statute as well. See N.Y.
MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10 (McKinney 1969 & Supp. 1993).
54. See Wambat Realty Corp. v. State of New York, 362 N.E.2d 581 (N.Y. 1969).
55. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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the area of local authority granted by Article IX, section two. Two
recent cases, decided on the same day by the New York Court of
Appeals, provide an excellent discussion of the proper construction of
municipalities' general and exaction5 6 powers.
In Kamhi v. PlanningBoard, 7 the Court of Appeals faced a statutory challenge to the Town of Yorktown's in-lieu payment requirement. The town sought to apply its in-lieu fee ordinance to a site plan
approval for development of open space,58 though the language of the
state Town Law provision authorizing exactions and in-lieu fees referred only to subdivision approvals."9 The plaintiff claimed that the
failure of the legislature to include the term "site plan" in the statute
rendered Yorktown's ordinance ultra vires, and therefore void.'
The Court of Appeals agreed, finding that the language of the
Town Law permitted in-lieu fee requirements to be placed only on
subdivision approvals. 6 ' The court reasoned that, as site plans were
not mentioned specifically in the statute, they were not contemplated
in the statutory grant of exaction authority. 62 The court did not find
this to be dispositive, however. Rather, it noted that Article IX's
63
promise of home rule, bolstered by the Municipal Home Rule Law,
gave municipalities a considerable additional sphere of authority over
matters of local concern, authority which. must be "liberally
construed."'
While local enactments which are inconsistent with state laws are
ordinarily void,65 the court noted that the Municipal Home Rule Law
provides local governments with a "supersession authority. ' 66 Pursuant to this authority, a town may
amend or supersede, in its local application, any provision of the
town law relating to the property, affairs or government of the
town or to other matters in relations to which it is authorized to
adopt local laws by this section, notwithstanding that such provi56. Each type of municipality in New York has been given some form of the traditional exaction power. See N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-725(a) (McKinney Supp. 1993);
N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 30 (McKinney 1989); N.Y. TOWN LAW § 277 (McKinney
1987).
57. 547 N.E.2d 346 (N.Y. 1989).
58. See supra note 33.
59. See N.Y. TOWN LAW § 274-a (McKinney 1987).
60. Kamhi, 547 N.E.2d at 348.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10 (McKinney 1969 & Supp. 1993).
64. Kamhi, 547 N.E.2d at 349.
65. See infra text accompanying note 81.
66. Kamhi, 547 N.E.2d at 349; N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10(l)(ii)(d)(3) (McKinney 1969 & Supp. 1993).
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sion is a general law, unless the legislature expressly shall have prohibited the adoption of such a local law.67

Based on this provision of the Home Rule Law, the court concluded that since parkland was a "uniquely local" 68 concern, the town
could supersede the Town Law to the extent that the statute did not
grant exaction authority to site plan approvals.69 In summary, the
court construed the Town Law's exaction provision narrowly, but
held that localities' powers under it would be construed more broadly
when the exaction is being used to finance a facility, such as a park,
which is "local" in character.
7 ° the Court
In Albany Area Builders Ass'n v. Town of Guilderland,
of Appeals apparently sought to limit its holding in Kamhi. In Albany Area Builders, the court reviewed an impact fee ordinance
designed to provide the municipality with funds to upgrade its road
network. The Town of Guilderland, a suburb of Albany, had concluded that its population would increase "substantially" over a
twenty-year period. 7 ' It found further that this projected population
increase would have a direct and adverse impact on the town's transportation network, as existing roads were considered insufficient to
handle projected increases in traffic.72 To address this transportation
problem, the town enacted an ordinance requiring applicants for development permits to pay a fee which would be used to fund future
expansion of the town's transportation network.7 3 The plaintiff developer alleged, inter alia, that the impact fee requirement constituted an
unauthorized exercise of town authority.7 4

The Court of Appeals unanimously agreed. As in Kamhi, the court
noted at the outset of its discussion the "fundamental principle" that
municipal power is derived entirely from the state, and that municipalities enjoy certain powers pursuant to the state constitution. 75 The
court then discussed the preemption doctrine, which limits municipal
home rule powers (the doctrine was found inapplicable in Kamhi 76).
The court described New York's preemption doctrine as follows:
[w]hile localities have been invested with substantial powers both
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

N.Y. Mun. Home Rule Law § 10(l)(ii)(a)(3) (McKinney 1969 & Supp. 1993).
Kamhi, 547 N.E.2d at 350.
Id.
546 N.E.2d 920 (N.Y. 1989).
Id.
Id. at 921.
Id. at 920.
Id. at 921.
Albany Area Builders, 546 N.E.2d at 921.
Kamhi, 547 N.E.2d at 350.
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by affirmative grant and restriction on State powers in matters of
local concern, the overriding limitation of the preemption doctrine
legislature to
embodies "the untrammeled primacy of the [state]
77
act ... with respect to matters of state concern."
State preemption of local enactments is found readily by New York
courts. Preemption occurs in two situations. First, a local enactment
is preempted by state law where there is "express conflict" between
the provisions of state and local law. 71 Second, state preemption oc79
curs where the state has "evidenced its intent to occupy [a] field."
The state is not required to express its intent in order to preempt a
local law; the state's intent may be inferred "from the nature of the
subject matter being regulated and the purpose of intent" of the
state's legislative scheme.8 0
The Court of Appeals applied this preemption test to the Guilderland impact fee, and found that state law indeed preempted the ordinance."s The court found that, through its passage of several
provisions of the Town and Highway laws, the legislature had "evidenced its decision to regulate how roadway improvements are budgeted, how these improvements are financed, and how moneys for these
improvements are to be expended."8' 2 Under the "intent to occupy"
prong of the preemption doctrine, the creation of such a comprehensive regulatory scheme for highway development and maintenance the same purposes sought to be promoted by the Guilderland ordinance - resulted in preemption. The Guilderland ordinance was
therefore invalidated. 3
Based on the Court of Appeals' rulings in Kamhi and Albany Area
Builders, New York courts generally will construe municipal exaction
77. Albany Area Builders, 546 N.E.2d at 922 (quoting Wambat Realty Corp. v. State
of New York, 362 N.E.2d 581 (N.Y. 1969)).
78. Id. (citing In re Landstown Entertainment Corp. v. New York City Dep't of Consumer Affairs, 543 N.E.2d 725 (N.Y. 1989)).
79. Id. (citing Consolidated Edison Co. v. Town of Red Hook, 456 N.E.2d 487 (N.Y.
1983)).
80. Id. (citing New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 505 N.E.2d 915
(N.Y. 1987)). Note the difference between the New York state constitutional standard
for preemption and the federal preemption standard, under which Congress clearly must
state its intent to preempt state law. See, e.g., Penn. Terra Ltd. v. Pennsylvania Dep't of
Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267, 272-73 (3d Cir. 1984) (stating that federal preemption
analysis begins with the "basic assumption that Congress did not intend to displace state
law;" also noting that Congress must have clearly intended to preempt state law for
courts to find preemption); see also Eric W. Hess, Note, FederalPreemption of Rent Regulation Under FIRREA, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 939, 945 (1993).
81. Albany Area Builders, 546 N.E.2d at 922.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 923.

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. XX

powers narrowly, limiting them to their express terms. However, in
cases where the municipality exercises its exaction authority to promote a local interest relating to its "property, affairs, or government,"
its authority will be construed more broadly. Where the interest underlying exaction or in-lieu payment requirements is not uniquely local, reviewing courts will invalidate any exaction ordinance that is not
specifically authorized by statute, or that is preempted by general
84
state laws.
B.

Constitutional Issues

Review of impact fee requirements involves a two-step analysis. s5
Assuming a municipal impact fee requirement is authorized by state
statute, it must still pass muster under the federal and state constitutions. This part reviews the tests developed by state courts to analyze
exactions and impact fees. It then discusses the Supreme Court's
1987 decision in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,s6 which
represents the standard by which exaction and impact fee requirements are reviewed under the Takings Clause of the United States
Constitution.87
Traditional exaction and dedication requirements have been upheld
because they addressed needs which flowed directly from the proposed development. a Impact fees, however, raise revenue in order to
address municipality-wide needs.8 9 They frequently attack problems
that existed prior to the proposed development, and therefore cannot
be justified solely on the ground that the problem sought to be addressed is uniquely attributable to the proposed development.
The justification for impact fees is more likely to rest on traditional
police power grounds, with the municipality maintaining that the impact fee is required to promote the health, safety, or general welfare of
the municipality. 90 While the police power grants states and local
84. See also Home Builders Ass'n v. County of Onondaga, 573 N.Y.S.2d 863, 865
(state laws establishing comprehensive sewer district regulation scheme preempted
county from imposing sewer impact fee). Given the ease with which New York courts
find preemption, it may well be that the rule in Kamhi will be limited to local parkland
exactions.
85. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
86. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
87. U.S. CONST. amend. V.; see also Chicago B. & Q. R. R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226
(1897) (stating that takings clause of U.S. Constitution applies against States through
fourteenth amendment).
88. See Connors & High, supra note 31, at 70.
89. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
90. See Connors & High, supra note 31, at 75.
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governments a great deal of authority to address these concerns, 9' it is
not unlimited; courts have long recognized that where police power
regulation goes too far, it may be voided as an unconstitutional taking. 92 This tension between a municipality's police power and the
Takings Clause is pertinent in analyzing the constitutionality of impact fees.
1.

Pre-NollanStandards of Review

Prior to 1987, state courts generally used one of three tests to determine the validity of exaction and impact fee requirements.9 3 The first
of these tests was known as the "uniquely and specifically attributable" test. 94 This standard, developed by the Illinois courts, permitted
exaction requirements to stand only when they addressed burdens
which were specifically and uniquely attributable to the subject development.9 5 In addition to requiring a close nexus between the development and the exaction requirement, the test required that all benefit to
be derived from the exaction flow solely to the proposed development,
not to the public at large.9 6 As a result of its strict requirements and
the inherent difficulty of containing benefits to a single development,
New York joined the majority of jurisdictions that considered this test
and rejected it as too strict. 97
The second test was the "rational nexus" test. Under this test, a
developer could be compelled to pay a fee which bore a "rational
nexus" to the needs and benefits arising from and resulting to the subject development. 98 Unlike the uniquely and specifically attributable
standard, the rational nexus test permitted some benefit from exactions to flow to the public at large. Nevertheless, New York courts
rejected this approach to exaction as well, finding that the need to
apportion costs and benefits between the subject development and
public at large would be unworkable in a densely populated state with
so many competing interests. 99
91. See, e.g., Ziffrin v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 139 (1940); Nebbia v. New York, 291
U.S. 502, 542 (1934) (police power is the "least limitable" power of government).
92. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
93. See Holmes v. Planning Bd., 433 N.Y.S. 587, 597 (App. Div. 1980); Delaney,
supra note 16, at 148-53.
94. Holmes, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 597.
95. Id. (citing Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. Village of Mt. Prospect, 176 N.E.2d
799 (Ill. 1961)).
96. Id. (citing Aunt Hack Ridge Estates v. Planning Comm'n, 230 A.2d 45 (Conn.
1967)).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 598 (citing Longbridge Bldrs. v. Planning Bd., 245 A.2d 336 (N.J. 1968)).
99. Holmes, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 598.
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The third test used prior to Nollan was the "reasonable relationship" test, which was developed by the California courts.1°° Unlike
the first two tests, the reasonable relationship test permitted municipalities to impose exaction or fee requirements solely on police power
grounds - the exaction could be enacted specifically for the purpose
of promoting the general welfare of the municipality. Under this test,
exaction requirements would be upheld so long as there was a reasonable connection between the problem sought to be alleviated and the
proposed development. If this liberal cause and effect relationship
could be demonstrated, and the exaction did not impose an "undue
cost burden" on the developer, the exaction requirement would be
upheld.
2.

TraditionalNew York Exaction Analysis
The New York Court of Appeals appeared to establish its own
standard for exaction requirements in Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale." 2 In Jenad, the court upheld an ordinance that gave the Scarsdale Planning Commission the power to demand either a dedication
of land or an in-lieu payment as a condition precedent to subdivision
or plat approval.103 If a fee was exacted, it was to be placed in a
separate account earmarked specifically for park or recreational
purposes. ' o

Having found that the Scarsdale ordinance was expressly authorized by the New York Village Law,'10 the court considered the constitutional arguments. The plaintiff claimed that the in-lieu payment
was invalid because it was an illegal taking and imposed a "tax" on
developers. It argued further that, while the fee was designated for
"general government purposes," it was assessed only against subdivision developers. The Court of Appeals rejected these arguments,
characterizing the requirement as a reasonable form of planning
designed to promote the general good.' °6 The court supported its
holding as follows:
Scarsdale and other communities, observing that their vacant lands
were being cut up into subdivision lots, and being alert to their
responsibilities, saw to it, before it was too late, that the subdivi100. See Ayres v. City of Los Angeles, 207 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1949).
101. Holmes, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 598.
102. 218 N.E.2d 673 (N.Y. 1966).
103. Id. at 675. Whether land or a fee was to be exacted was left to the Planning
Commission's discretion.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 674.
106. Id. at 676.
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sions make allowance for open park spaces therein. This was
merely a kind of zoning [similar to] other reasonable requirements
for necessary [infrastructure]. If the developers did not provide for
parks and playgrounds in their own tracts, the municipality would
it would now be requiredfor the benefit of all the
have to do it0since
' 7
inhabitants.
Jenad contained no mention of the three tests discussed above. In
fact, the court cited opinions from other states that had applied the
strikingly different "specifically and uniquely attributable" and "reasonable relationship" tests.' 08 However, in Holmes v. Planning
Board,0 9 the Appellate Division noted that the above-quoted language suggests strongly that the Court of Appeals saw the police
power, standing alone, as a legitimate basis for exaction and fee requirements. Specifically, the court stated in Holmes that "Jenad
strongly emphasize[d] a police power rationale" in upholding Scarsdale's fee requirement." 0 New York courts following Jenad and
Holmes have therefore examined exaction and fee requirements in a
deferential manner, and have upheld exaction requirements which
were reasonably related to the subject development and which did not
place an undue or confiscatory cost burden on the affected developer.
3.

Nollan v. California Coastal Commission

All cases involving alleged regulatory takings implicate the Federal
Constitution, which provides the minimum requirements for governmental taking of private property."' In 1987, the Supreme Court decided Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,"12 a case involving a
state-imposed exaction requirement. The case arose when the petitioner, a beachfront property owner, sought a permit to replace the
bungalow on his property with a new house. California law required
the California Coastal Commission (the "Commission") to approve
all coastal development permits." 3 In considering Nollan's application, the Commission found, inter alia, that the new house would
block visual access to the beach., It therefore conditioned approval of
107. Jenad, 218 N.E.2d at 676 (emphasis added).
108. Id. Specifically, the Court of Appeals cited Jordan v. Menomonee Falls, 137
N.W.2d 442 (Wis. 1956) (reasonable relationship) and Billings Properties v. Yellowstone
Co., 394 P.2d 182 (Mont. 1964) (specifically and uniquely attributable).
109. 433 N.Y.S.2d 587 (App. Div. 1980).
110. Id. at 590. This characterization of Jenad and the proper test to be used in New
York has been restated frequently by New York courts confronted with the issue. See,
e.g., Castle Properties v. Ackerson, 558 N.Y.S.2d 334 (App. Div. 1990).
111. See supra note 87.
112. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
113. Id. at 828.
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the building permit on Nollan's dedication of a lateral public easement linking the two public beach areas which bordered his property.' 1 4 Justice Scalia opened his opinion for the Court with the
following observation:
Had California simply required the Nollans to make an easement
available to the public on a permanent basis in order to increase
public access to the beach, rather than conditioning their permit to
rebuild their house on their agreeing
to do so, we have no doubt
3
there would have been a taking." s
In the Court's view, therefore, the easement requirement upon
which the development permit was conditioned was the crucial factor
in the case. Justice Scalia then noted the fundamental test that historically had guided the Court in its regulatory takings jurisprudence land use regulations and permit conditions would be valid so long as
they substantially advanced legitimate state interests." 6 If the challenged regulation or restriction was not reasonably necessary to promote a legitimate state interest, then it would be found to represent a
7
taking for which the affected owner would have to be compensated. "1
The Commission argued that a condition imposed as part of the
development permitting process would not be a taking if it advanced
the same police power objective as an outright refusal to grant the
permit." s The Court agreed with this characterization of the test,
holding that conditions placed on permit issuance would be upheld so
long as they served the same governmental purpose as would a ban on
development.' 19 In short, the Court required a nexus between the
stated governmental objective and the permit condition. Failure to
establish this nexus would, in Justice Scalia's words, transform the
regulation into an "out-and-out plan of extortion."' 120
Having established the test, the Court applied it to the Commission's easement requirement and found the requisite nexus to be lacking. 2' Rather than finding that the Commission's requirement
substantially advanced the asserted visual access interest, the Court
114. Id. at 828-29.
115. Id. at 831.
116. Id. at 841.
117. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841 (citing Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) and Penn
Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)).
118. Id. at 836.
119. Id.; see also note 147, infra.
120. Id. at 837 (quoting J.E.D. Associates, Inc. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14-5 (N.H.
1981)).
121. Id.
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found that it did not meet "even the most untailored standards."' 22
Specifically, the Court noted that it was impossible to demonstrate
how the granting of an easement, which permitted people already on
the beach to cross the Nollans' property, would reduce any visual obstacles to the beach. Based on this finding, the Court held that the
Commission's imposition of the easement requirement represented a
123
taking which required compensation.
The Court's analysis suggests that a heightened level of review is
appropriate when determining whether or not the required substantial
advancement has occurred. This heightened level of scrutiny is to be
applied to both the legitimacy of the asserted state interest and the
extent to which the regulation advances the interest.1 24 Despite this
seemingly heightened level of review, however, the test enunciated in
Nollan is indistinguishable from the reasonable relationship standard
used previously by the states. The Nollan Court never questioned
that the police power, standing alone, provided a sufficient basis for
imposing exaction requirements.1 2- In summary, the Court found in
Nollan that the reasonable relationship test, as previously developed
by the states but more strictly applied, satisfied the takings requirements of the Fifth Amendment.
IV. Would an Affordable Housing Impact Fee Enacted by New
York City Survive Judicial Review?
If New York City were to follow the example of other cities 126 and
enact an ordinance authorizing the imposition of affordable housing
impact fees on developers, there would be little doubt that the ordinance would be challenged early in its operation. As seen in Part III,
the reviewing court would have to determine the ordinance's validity
on two grounds. First, the court would have to determine whether or
122. No~lan, 483 U.S. at 839.
123. Id.
124. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841. That the Court intended to raise the level of scrutiny
applied in regulatory takings cases was demonstrated most clearly by Justice Scalia's assertion that "the Fifth Amendment's Property Clause [is] more than a pleading requirement," and that compliance with it is "more than an exercise in cleverness and
imagination." Id.
125. Recall that two of the three standards developed by the states, the specifically and
uniquely attributable and rational nexus tests, required that all or some benefit flow to the
affected development. Only the reasonable relationship test, the most liberal test used,
recognized the police power as a legitimate basis for use of the exaction power. See supra
Part III.B. 1. In fact, the Court included Jenad among the cases it cited as supporting its
view. No~lan, 483 U.S. at 840.
126. San Francisco, Boston, and Sacramento have all enacted affordable housing impact fee ordinances. See Delaney, supra note 16 at 143.
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not New York City. possesses state statutory or constitutional authority to enact the ordinance. Second, the court would have to pass on
the ordinance's constitutionality under the Fifth Amendment's Tak27
ings Clause.
A.

Statutory Authority

As discussed previously, the New York Legislature has considered,
but not enacted, specific impact fee legislation. 128 New York City
would therefore have to identify implied authority from either another statute or Article IX of the state constitution.
Section thirty of the General City Law ("GCL") gives cities in New
York roughly the same type of exaction authority as that given to
towns and villages. I" Section thirty authorizes city planning commissions to condition subdivision or plat approval on the dedication of
land or payment of a fee for park or recreational purposes.130 The
GCL also requires cities to ensure that a developer adequately has
provided for paved streets, water mains, and other utilities before al3
lowing the development to proceed.' '
In Kamhi, the Court of Appeals indicated that exaction authority
would be construed narrowly and limited essentially to its express
terms. 1 32 Thus, it is unlikely that the GCL's exaction power, which
mentions only parks and municipal utilities, could support imposition
of impact fees for affordable housing. As affordable housing is not
mentioned in the statute, the reviewing court would be compelled
under Kamhi to find that an affordable housing impact fee is unauthorized under section thirty.
Section thirty-a of the GCL, however, grants cities a limited
amount of additional exaction authority. 3 Section thirty-a governs
city approval of site plans (recall that section thirty is limited to subdivisions and plats), and authorizes city planning commissions to im127. As the New York Constitution also contains a takings clause, N.Y. CONST. art. I,
§ 7, the ordinance would also be required to pass muster under state constitutional standards. However, the takings requirements under state constitutional standards are essentially similar to those of the Federal Constitution, making it unlikely that the state
constitution would provide any independent obstacles to an impact fee ordinance's validity. See, e.g., Seawall Assoc. v. City of New York, 542 N.E.2d 1059 (N.Y.), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 976 (1989).
128. See supra note 48.
129. See supra note 56.
130. See N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 30 (McKinney 1989).
131. Id.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 57-69.
133. See N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 30-a (McKinney 1989).
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pose conditions on development permits generally.' 3 4 The statute
gives city planning commissions the power to specify any elements to
be included in a site plan which "may reasonably be related to the
13 5
health, safety and general welfare of the community."
This section clearly confers broader exaction authority for development approvals. The open ended police power provision empowers
city planning commissions to demand, as a condition of plan approval, that site plan developers provide anything required for the
general welfare of the community. As such, the section appears to
authorize the imposition of affordable housing impact fees on developers whose site plan proposals are reasonably related to the need for
such housing.
As demonstrated by the Court of Appeals' decision in Albany Area
Builders,136 however, a finding that a municipality has the statutory
power to enact a law is not dispositive; the reviewing court must still
determine whether the state has preempted the field. Under the Albany Area Builders analysis,'3 7 the legislature's enactment of a comprehensive general law regulating a broad area evidences its intent to
occupy the field, and results in preemption of local legislation which
purports to govern the same area. For purposes of this analysis, the
question is whether the state has preempted the field of affordable
housing development and financing, thus foreclosing municipalities
from acting in that area pursuant to otherwise sufficient statutory
38
authority. 1
Through the General Municipal, 139 Private Housing Finance,'" °
and Public Housing' 4 ' Laws, the New York Legislature has set forth
an elaborate and seemingly comprehensive statutory scheme which
provides for the financing, development, and preservation of affordable housing in the state. As a result of these statutory provisions, it
would appear likely that the state has preempted the field.' 42 How134. Id.
135. Id. Specifically, section 30(a) permits a city planning commission to
specify ... the elements to be included in [site] plans submitted for approval:
such elements may include, where appropriate, those relating to parking, means
of access, screening, signs, landscaping, architectural features,. . impact of the
proposed land use on adjacent land uses, and such other elements as may reasonably be related to the health, safety and general welfare of the community.
Id. (emphasis added).
136. See supra text accompanying notes 70-83.
137. Id.
138. See supra text accompanying note 79.
139. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 690 (McKinney 1986).
140. N.Y. PRIV. Hous. FIN. LAW § 11 (McKinney 1991).
141. N.Y. PUB. Hous. LAW § I (McKinney 1989).
142. It also seems unlikely that New York City could argue successfully that afforda-
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ever, despite the comprehensiveness of the state statutes relating to
affordable housing, courts have ruled that no preemption has oc14 3
curred in the area of affordable housing provision.
Another factor making application of the preemption doctrine unlikely is New York City's broad charter authority relating to the development, financing, and regulation of affordable housing. The New
York City Charter creates a City Department of Housing Preservation and Development ("HPD"), and gives HPD expansive powers
relating to housing in New York City.'44 For purposes of impact fees,
the most significant of these powers is HPD's express authority to
45
collect fees for the financing of housing programs.
Section thirty-a of the General City Law, bolstered by New York
City's charter-based authority relating to housing, suggest that New
York City possesses ample statutory authority to enact an impact fee
ordinance designed to increase the availability of affordable housing.
B.

Constitutional Validity

While it seems likely that New York City possesses the statutory
authority to enact an affordable housing impact fee ordinance, such
an ordinance must also pass constitutional muster. A carefully
drafted impact fee ordinance should, however, be able to satisfy
constitutional standards under both federal and state takings
jurisprudence.
1.

FederalStandards

Nollan expressly held that exactions imposed during the permit approval process will be upheld if they 1) promote the same police
power objective as a complete ban on development, and 2) are related
to and substantially advance that objective.' 4 6 A recent application of
Nollan by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit suggests
ble housing is a uniquely local concern, permitting it to avail itself of the supersession
authority. See supra text accompanying notes 66-69.
143. See Seawall Assoc. v. City of New York, 523 N.Y.S.2d 435, 444-46 (Sup. Ct.
1986), rev'd on other grounds, 534 N.Y.S.2d 958 (App. Div.), rev'd, 542 N.E.2d 1059,
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 976 (1989); Council for Owner Occupied Housing v. Koch, 462
N.Y.S.2d 762 (Sup. Ct. 1983).
144. The only types of housing not subject to HPD's plenary jurisdiction are publiclyowned housing projects, which are developed and owned by the New York City Housing
Authority, and certain types of housing for the homeless, which fall under the jurisdiction of the New York City Human Resources Administration. See NEW YORK, N.Y.,
CHARTER § 1801 (1989); N.Y. PUB. Hous. LAW § 402 (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1993).
145. See NEW YORK, N.Y., CHARTER § 1802 (1989).

146. See supra part III.B.3.
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that these requirements would easily be satisfied by a well-tailored
affordable housing impact fee ordinance.
Municipalities are permitted to impose a moratorium on development in order to preserve resources. 147 A municipality could therefore impose a moratorium on certain types of development if it
reasonably could demonstrate that such developments generally place
pressures on the supply of affordable housing in the municipality, in
turn forcing the municipality to devote more resources to meet housing needs. Assuming this relationship could be demonstrated, an affordable housing impact fee would satisfy the first prong of the Nollan
test. The fee would serve the same purpose as a development ban by
mitigating the financial burden that occurs when development increases the burden on the local stock of affordable housing.
The second prong of the test, reasonable relation to and substantial
advancement of the interest, can be satisfied as well. Exaction of an
impact fee for affordable housing assistance relates to the municipality's valid objective of providing affordable housing to its residents.148
So long as the exacted funds are earmarked specifically for housing
subsidies, there could be little question that the fee substantially advanced the interest.
The Ninth Circuit substantially adopted the above analysis in Commercial Builders v. City of Sacramento. 49 In Commercial Builders,
the court upheld a Sacramento ordinance that conditioned issuance of
nonresidential building permits on payment of an impact fee for lowincome housing.'
The plaintiff in the case did not dispute that the
city had a legitimate interest in providing affordable housing,' 5 ' but
contended that the Sacramento ordinance placed the "burden of paying for low-income housing on nonresidential developers without a
sufficient showing that nonresidential development contributes to the
need for low-income housing in proportion to that burden."' 52
The court rejected this view. At the outset of its discussion, the
court noted Justice Scalia's observation in Nollan that the rational
nexus test, the most liberal of the standards developed in the state
147. This is implicit under federal law, as Justice Scalia's discussion in Nollan operated
necessarily from the premise that development bans represent a valid exercise of the police power. Development bans are also permitted under state constitutional standards.
See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835; Golden v. Planning Bd., 285 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y.), appeal
dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
148. It seems elementary that an adequate supply of affordable housing is related to the
health, safety, and general welfare of a municipality.
149. 941 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied 112 S. Ct. 1997 (1992).
150. Id. at 872.
151. Id. at 873.
152. Id.
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courts prior to 1987, represented the standard for examining exaction
requirements in the takings context. 15 3 Finding that Sacramento had
tied the ordinance to empirical findings showing a "substantial connection" between low-income housing needs and nonresidential development, 154 the court held that the Sacramento impact fee satisfied the
Nollan test, as it was sufficiently related to and substantially advanced
the city's interest in maintaining an adequate supply of low-income
housing.1 5The Ninth Circuit's analysis in Commercial Builders suggests that
an affordable housing impact fee ordinance will be found valid under
the Federal Constitution so long as the municipality presents general
empirical findings that demonstrate the Nollan nexus. Sacramento's
ordinance satisfied the nexus requirement by incorporating city-wide
findings that nonresidential development, by attracting new employees to the region, increased the need for low-income housing in the
city. Based on this analysis, it appears that the impact on an area's
resources of a class of development forms a sufficient basis for enacting an impact fee ordinance - no direct nexus is required between
any particular development and the burden sought to be alleviated by
the fee.
Under this standard, New York City could establish the required
nexus by demonstrating, for example, that certain classes of development (as opposed to certain developments) lead generally to an increase in the number of construction and office workers residing in the
city, a certain percentage of whom will be low-income. This relationship, supported by empirical findings, would link the covered class of
development to the need for affordable housing. Having established
this nexus, the city would be required to show only that the fee substantially advanced the city's interest in providing affordable housing.
If the collected fees were deposited in a discrete account, the substantial advancement would be manifestly clear, as the account would
make more money available for housing programs.
2. State Standards
Under New York's interpretation of Nollan, a closer relationship
between the asserted governmental interest and the particular development might be necessary to insure validity. The New York Court
153. Id. (citing Nollan, 483 U.S. at 839). Indeed, the Court in Nollan cited a number
of cases (including Jenad) that had followed the reasonable relationship test in support of
its decision.
154. Commercial Builders, 941 F.2d at 874.
155. Id. at 875.
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of Appeals' most significant application of Nollan occurred in Seawall
Associates v. City of New York, 15 6 a case involving a Takings Clause
challenge to a New York City local law that prohibited the conversion
or demolition, and required the upkeep, of low-income single room
occupancy ("SRO") residential buildings. As a defense to the takings
claim, the city had argued that the law was necessary to address the
city's homelessness problem. 57 The Court of Appeals, in a five-totwo decision, agreed with the plaintiff developers that the local law
resulted in a regulatory taking of their property. 158
The Court opened its regulatory takings discussion by referring to
Nollan's suggestion that the Takings Clause prohibits the passing of
public burdens onto private actors.5 9 It then restated Nollan's requirement that the city ordinance must substantially advance its purported objective.'" The court concluded that the anticonversion law
could not pass the Nollan test.
The city had maintained that the local law was designed to alleviate
its homeless situation. While noting that this goal was of the "greatest social importance,"'' the court construed the law's stated purpose
strictly. On its face, the anticonversion law stated specifically that it
was designed to prevent homelessness.162 The court interpreted this
statement of purpose literally, and analyzed the law for its potential to
"substantially alleviate" or "resolve" the problem of homelessness.' 63
Not surprisingly, the court found that the law could not achieve its
lofty goal.'6 This finding, coupled with the court's conclusion that
not all of the units preserved by the anticonversion law would actually
go to homeless persons, led the court to conclude that the ordinance
had only a "tenuous connection" to its claimed objective.' 65 Such a
tenuous connection was insufficient to satisfy Nollan's substantial advancement requirement, and the court voided the ordinance as a
66
taking. 1
The Seawall Associates analysis suggests that, in the wake of Nol156. 542 N.E.2d 1059, cert. denied 493 U.S. 976 (1989).
157. SRO buildings have traditionally been used by New York City as a significant
housing resource for the homeless.
158. Seawall Assoc., 542 N.E.2d at 1068.
159. Id. at 1062 (quoting Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835 n.4).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1068.
162. Id. n.10.
163. Seawall Assoc., 542 N.E.2d at 1068.
164. Id. The court noted that the city's homelessness study conceded that the anticonversion law would not "resolve" the problem of homelessness.
165. Id. at 1069.
166. Id.
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lan, New York courts will apply closer scrutiny to exaction requirements than the federal courts. Under the analysis employed by the
Ninth Circuit in Commercial Builders, New York City's ordinance,
which probably would have prevented some homelessness, would
likely have been upheld, as it advanced the city's broadly stated interest. The New York Court of Appeals, however, construed the city's
stated interest strictly, finding that its goal of "preventing homelessness" was unlikely to be achieved through the ordinance. The general
relationships found sufficient in Commercial Builders are apparently
insufficient under New York courts' view of Nollan and the Takings
Clause in general. Instead, only specific showings that the stated interest is related to and will be advanced
by the challenged require67
satisfactory.
found
be
will
ment
Despite the high level of scrutiny applied to exaction requirements
by New York courts, a carefully-drafted affordable housing impact fee
ordinance, such as the one presented in the appendix to this Note,
should be able to withstand judicial review. In order to ensure its
validity, the ordinance should apply on the basis of particular findings, rather than on general findings such as those which supported
the Sacramento ordinance. In other words, the fee requirement
facially should apply only to those particular development proposals
which can be shown to have an impact on affordable housing.
This particular relationship could be established by linking the fee
provision to New York City's Environmental Quality Review Procedure ("CEQR"), 68 which requires certain significant land use proposals to be reviewed for their potential environmental impacts. Among
the factors which must be reviewed under CEQR is the potential impact of a land use action on "population patterns or existing commu167. This interpretation of Seawall Associates and the prevailing New York view is
supported by a subsequent appellate decision in which the court voided a set of permit
conditions which required, inter alia, that the developer provide fountains in its development (such a requirement is permitted under the Town Law, which authorizes towns to
impose requirements for the purpose of improving aesthetics). The court nullified the
fountain requirement on the ground that "nothing in the record [could] show how they
would be aesthetically pleasing." The court's holding, which rejected a subjective legislative determination not capable of empirical demonstration, suggests a judicial willingness
in New York to scrutinize not only the means-ends relationship, but the legislative body's
conclusions regarding how best to achieve desired results. See Castle Properties Co. v.
Anderson, 558 N.Y.S.2d 334, 336 (App. Div. 1990).
168. See NEW YORK, N.Y., Exec. Order No. 91, City Environmental Quality Review,
August 24, 1977, revised October 1, 1991. CEQR is the process through which New
York City complies with the State Environmental Quality Review Act ("SEQRA"),
which requires the state and its political subdivisions to conduct thorough reviews of the
potential environmental impacts of proposed land use actions prior to their approval. See
N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0101 (McKinney 1984).
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nity character."' 6 9 A New York City ordinance authorizing impact
fees,:, therefore, could satisfy the nexus requirement by applying
facially only to those developments which are found through the
CEQR process to have a potentially adverse impact on the availability
of affordable housing. This approach would tie the fee requirement to
findings made during the CEQR review, providing a solid and partic-

ular nexus between the proposed development, the need for affordable
housing, and the fee. Such an ordinance should pass muster even
under the stricter approach to exactions and takings taken by the
New York courts.
V. Conclusion
Impact fees are an innovative way for municipalities to share their
burdens with the private actors who, through their developments,
help to create them. Unquestionably, affordable housing has long

been one of New York City's most daunting problems. While the city
has attacked the problem directly, 70 its efforts have been scaled back
in the face of recent fiscal difficulties. The New York City Council
should consider the benefits to be gained through the use of affordable
housing impact fees. In addition to providing much-needed revenue

for housing programs, an impact fee ordinance that provides for uniform fees for those development proposals which have been identified

through CEQR to have an impact on housing would inject more fairness and notice into New York City's exaction practices.' 7 ' Far from
169. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0105(6) (McKinney 1984); N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.2 (1987); see also Chinese Staff & Workers v. City of New

York, 502 N.E.2d 176, 179-80 (N.Y. 1986).
170. See supra part I. For an excellent discussion of the other tools available to municipalities faced with an affordable housing shortage, see generally John R. Nolon, Shattering the Myth of Municipal Impotence: The Authority of Local Government to Create
Affordable Housing, 17 FORD. URB. L. J. 383 (1989); John P. Dellera, County Powers in
Assisted Housing Programs: The ConstitutionalLimits in New York, 20 FORD. URB. L.J.
109 (1993).
171. For a contrary view of the wisdom and legitimacy of affordable housing exactions,
see Norman Marcus, Development Exactions: The Emerging Law of New York State,
C431 ALI-ABA 1725 (1989). While Marcus recognizes that SEQRA could serve as the
"enabling predicate" for housing exactions in New York, he argues that general taxation,
not exaction, should be used to finance housing programs. One of his three main critiques is that the use of exaction would "raise basic questions as to the integrity of the
process best characterized by the dirty words 'zoning for sale.'"
I disagree with this assertion, and would argue that the impact fee ordinance proposed
in this Note would remedy, rather than exacerbate, this problem. As demonstrated in
Part I, presently the city uses an informal type of exaction. If any process could be
characterized as "zoning for sale," it is the present system, in which the "developer concessions" (read "exactions") are "agreed to" through closed door negotiations. The
model impact fee ordinance proposed in this Note reforms the present system by provid-
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requiring real estate developers to "underwrite social policy,"1172 affordable housing impact fees would help New York City address its
housing needs by placing a proportionate amount of the housing burden on the parties whose developments help to create it.
James Berger

ing for uniform fees (assessed as a function of the size of the proposed development)
which are imposed only where specific stated criteria are present. In short, the ordinance
would remove the city's ability to "negotiate" more onerous concessions from wealthy
developers.
172. Commercial Builders, 941 F.2d at 876 (Beezer, J. dissenting).
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Appendix
MODEL NEW YORK CITY LOCAL LAW AUTHORIZING AFFORDABLE

HOUSING IMPACT FEES

§ 1 - POLICY & PURPOSES
The City Council of the City of New York finds that
(1) the city faces a shortage of affordable housing which threatens
the health, safety, and general welfare of the municipality;
(2) the city has an obligation to assist in the preservation, rehabilitation, and production of affordable housing;
(3) certain development projects attract new workers to the city,
placing pressure on the supply and availability of affordable housing,
and impact existing population patterns and community character;
(4) the city incurs substantial costs in providing and assisting in the
provision of affordable housing;
(5) it is the policy of the city to require developers to share the
housing burdens caused by their developments.
§ 2 - DEFINITIONS
For purposes of this local law, the following definitions shall apply:
(a) "assisted housing" is defined as any housing which is produced,
rehabilitated, or otherwise subsidized utilizing city funds in whole or
part;
(b) "affected development" is defined as any proposed site plan, subdivision, or plat that:
(1) requires approval under section 197-c of the City Charter, and
(2) has been found, pursuant to the City Environmental Quality
Review Procedure, to have a potentially adverse impact on the demand for or supply of affordable housing in the city.
(c) "applicant" is defined as the person whose name appears on an
application submitted to the City Planning Commission pursuant to
section 197-c requesting permission to build the affected development.
§ 3 - IMPACT FEES
(a) The City Planning Commission may, as a condition of approving
an affected development, require the applicant to pay a fee for the
preservation and development of assisted housing in the city.
(b) Within six months after the effective date of this local law, the
Commissioner of Housing Preservation and Development shall, after
consultation with the Comptroller and the Commissioner of Finance,
publish a schedule of impact fees. Such fees are to be set on a uniform
basis as a function of the proposed population of the affected
development.
(c) All impact fees are to be deposited in a separate budget account to
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be established by the Comptroller; such fees shall be made available
by the Comptroller to the Commissioner of Housing Preservation and
Development on an annual basis, and may be used by the commissioner for the sole purpose of providing assisted housing in the city.

